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The Crisis of the Finance-Led 
Regime of Accumulation
and the Situation of Brazil1
LEDA MARIA PAULANI 
Capitalist Reproduction According to the Theory of 
Regulation
THE MOVEMENT KNOWN as the “French School” of the regulation theory of economics, whose seminal work is Aglietta’s (1976) and which is hereafter referred to simply as “regulation theory”, seeks to 
forge a theoretical instrument that explains how the normal reproduction of 
contradictory social relationships takes place or, in other words, how capitalist 
economies are able to preserve a regime of accumulation seeing that they 
are socially constituted by immanent confl icts.2 The theory assumes that, 
in each historical moment, the capitalist process of accumulation takes on a 
specifi c form. From this premise, it unfolds the Marxist concept of mode of 
production into two categories: a regime of accumulation (RA), comprising 
the economic and social regularities that assure long-term accumulation in 
each historical moment, and a mode of regulation (MR), which is the set of 
individual or collective procedures and behaviors capable of reproducing the 
fundamental relations of the accumulation process, of sustaining and guiding 
the current regime of accumulation, and of assuring the compatibility of 
decentralized decisions. This latter role of the mode of regulation implies 
that compatible decentralized decisions can be made by the economic players 
without them needing to interiorize the principles of adjustment of the 
system as whole. In other words, this set of procedures indicates that social 
factors are embedded in individual behaviors and, in this sense, the mode of 
regulation is the materialization of the current regime of accumulation.
The regime of accumulation involves fi ve social and economic 
regularities, namely: how production is organized and how workers relate to 
the means of production; the temporal horizon of capital valuation, which 
defi nes the management principles; the composition of social demand; the 
distributive pattern of the dynamic reproduction of the various classes and 
social groups; and the articulation of non-capitalist forms (when they have a 
determinative role in establish the current economic milieu).
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The mode of regulation, in turn, comprises a set of fi ve institutional 
forms: the relations of work (how labor is divided technically, how workers 
are connected to their companies, the factors that determine worker income, 
the workers’ way of life); the intercapitalist competitive relationship (the 
logic presiding the competition between capitals, the dominant type of 
competition); the monetary and fi nancial regime (the prevailing type of 
currency, the framework of international payments, the role of fi nance); the 
form of organization of the State (the goals that guide its organization and 
means of intervention); and the international regime (the prevailing posture 
in the economic relationships between various national economies). By 
interacting, these fi ve institutional forms establish the binomial RA-MR that 
determines the specifi c form that the accumulation of capital will take on in 
each historical moment.
Synthetically speaking, the regulation theory concerns the institutions, 
norms, calculations and procedures that assure the reproduction of capital 
as a social relation. Crises emerge because, albeit regulated and given its 
contradictory character, the reproduction process implies disruptions and 
discontinuities. In times of crisis, the MR and the RA become disjointed and 
challenge the institutional forms that had previously assured the functionality 
of the binomial.
The Finance-Led Regime of Accumulation 
Scrutinizing the characteristics that distinguished capitalism in the 
1980s and early 1990s (slow growth of production, decrease in wages, 
unemployment in many countries, enormous growth in the value of fi nancial 
assets, unstable conjuncture intermingled with monetary and fi nancial jolts, 
and extensive contagion between countries), François Chesnais began to 
advocate in 1996 and 1997 that capitalism had been since the early 1980s 
a regime of accumulation dominated by fi nancial valuation, and that it had 
actually established a mode of regulation to match this type of accumulation. 
Combining regulatory concepts with a Marxist approach, Chesnais (1997, p. 
21) writes:
Resulting from impasses brought about by [capitalist] accumulation during the 
“thirty glorious years,”3 this mode is based on the changes that took place in 
“wage relations” and on the exacerbation of the degree of exploitation […] but its 
workings are guided above all by the operations and the chosen forms of a more 
concentrated and more centralized fi nancial capitalism than in any other period of 
capitalism.
The fi nancial realm is therefore seen as the pivot an analysis of the 
accumulation process must be based. In the preface, he wrote for the Brazilian 
edition of La mondialisation fi nancière in 1998,4 Chesnais (1998, p. 7-8) says:
 The keystone of this construction is the fi nancial realm […]. The new regime 
of accumulation emerged in the 1980s, based on liberalization and deregulation 
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policies derived from the “conservative revolution” in the United States and the 
United Kingdom.
In a more recent work, Chesnais (2005)5 states that, in this regime of 
accumulation, interest-bearing capital (a category Marx developed in Capital, 
Book III, section V) is at the vortex of economic and social relations, and that 
the most important consequence of this central position is that the externality 
that characterizes this type of capital is inserted into the very bosom of 
productive accumulation, generating what he calls “patrimonial capitalism”, 
after Aglietta (1998). Thus,6 through the stock market, institutions that 
specialized in “fi nance-led accumulation” (pension funds, collective investment 
funds, insurance societies, banks that manage investment partnerships, hedge 
funds) became owners of large and globally important corporate groups and 
imposed upon the accumulation of productive capital itself a dynamics guided 
by an external agent, namely, the maximization of “shareholder value.” 
7T he basic idea is that holders of shares and large numbers of public 
and private debt instruments are, in effect, owners who were placed outside 
the production process – and not “creditors” as they are usually characterized. 
This leads to a distinction between “intermediated fi nance”, typical of the 
previous regime of accumulation, and “direct fi nance” that prevails in the 
current regime. For Chesnais, the term “creditor” implies both “loan” and 
a specifi c role for fi nance (ultimately, to direct savings to those who wish to 
invest). Present-day fi nance, however, unlike this one, is not moved by the 
need to produce or create new wealth. Its central institution is the secondary 
bond market, which only deals with existing assets. Given the existence and 
dissemination of these markets, investors never learn who their debtors are 
and don’t care who will foot the bill; they “only want know if the markets will 
remain liquid” (Chesnais, 2005, p. 49).
Patrimonial capitalism is aimed entirely toward transforming money 
from a “liquid asset” into a value that “produces”, whereby Chesnais (2005, 
p 50) retrieves Marx’s assertion by saying that “the pious vow of the hoarder 
is fulfi lled in interest-bearing capital, because his savings acquire the property 
of yielding income as naturally as pear trees bear pears.” To be sure, this is 
nothing new to capitalism. What Chesnais highlights as a novelty is the leading 
role taken on by property and rent-seeking, and the fact that their externality 
vis-à-vis production becomes embedded into the bosom of production itself. 
Thus, the congenital pathology of capitalism, i.e., the contradiction between 
capital and labor, now combines with other contradictions derived from the 
new central position of fi nance: accumulation, on one hand, is a slow process; 
fi nance, on the other, is insatiable in terms of its incitements. 
The point highlighted by Chesnais allows us to qualify the 
fi nancialization of capitalism. When referring to the primacy fi nancial 
valuation, this doesn’t mean that fi nancial valuation is quantitatively more 
important that productive valuation – even with fi nancial wealth having 
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increased exponentially over the last 30 years, as we will see. The primacy 
of fi nancial valuation is more qualitative than quantitative. The fact that its 
externality vis-à-vis production has become embedded in the productive realm 
explains numerous changes that occurred therein – whether in labor itself 
(e.g., the increase of precarious and informal work, or the large number of 
temporary, autonomous and part-time workers), in the management of the 
work process (e.g., “fl exible” workers, Toyotism) or even in the organization 
of the productive process as such (e.g., the dissemination of just-in-time, the 
customerization and displacement of production).
Thus, the production of income and real wealth now takes places under 
the imperatives of fi nance-led logic. Its processes must now comply with 
the need for quick turnovers and immediate realization of gains imposed by 
fi nancial accumulation. Because the “minimum” real yield that production 
must generate is very high8 (given the extreme appreciation of fi nancial assets, 
which results in pressures for an even more violent exploitation of labor), cash 
operations must be such that fi nancial accumulation ceases to be a support 
activity for production and becomes the very center and source of additional 
profi t. As such, the managers of today’s humongous capital groups are obliged 
to seek, fi rst and foremost, the maximization of the shareholder value, doing 
whatever it takes (fraudulent fi nancial statements, for instance, or share 
repurchase programs) to achieve it.
These processes are synergetic and, by promoting the growth of 
fi nancial wealth, help to impose – and give additional weight to – the 
supremacy of fi nancial logic. Derivative assets, the inexhaustibly creative 
fi nancial engineering that is build around them and the extremely high levels 
of leverage (unsecured operations) that they make possible further enhance 
fi nancial accumulation and its consequences and further highlight a second 
characteristic of the fi nancialized regime (the fi rst being its externality vis-à-vis 
production): the unparalleled growth of fi nancial wealth and, alongside with 
it, of fi ctitious capital. 
Marx calls fi ctitious capital everything that was not, is not and never 
will be capital, even if it functions as such. In general, fi ctitious capital 
includes ownership rights, rights over future appreciation (in stocks), income 
from interest on future appreciation (in private debt bonds) and resources 
from future taxation (in public bonds). In every one of these cases, any real-
life increase of the fi ctitious wealth depends on the processes of productive 
valuation and extraction of surplus-value – in other words, on the continuous 
production of surpluses and on the allocation of part of these surpluses to 
enhance the value of fi ctitious capital. There are certain elements, however, 
that make the fi ctitious valuation of fi ctitious wealth possible, releasing it from 
the constraints and limitations of productive accumulation. Firstly, the fact that 
these assets can be traded in stock exchanges, or in secondary bond markets, 
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enabling their “valorization” to derive exclusively from their own circulation, 
with no heed to anything resembling productive accumulation. Secondly, the 
fact that profi ts are no longer the necessary source of interest, which can now 
be obtained from wages or from resources extracted by the State. Thirdly, 
the prolifi c character of fi ctitious capital itself, as attested by the “production 
of rights” and the “production of valorization” that derivatives assets make 
possible. To be sure, the fragility and vulnerability of the economy and its 
propensity to crises increase pari passu with the growth of fi nancial wealth 
and the ensuing aggravation of systemic contradictions. The history of these 
liabilities needs to be retrieved. 
The Evolution of Financial Accumulation 
and the Current Crisis
One of the most important elements that substantiate the fi nancial 
primacy in the current process of capitalist reproduction is the enormous 
growth of the worldwide inventory of fi nancial assets. These have expanded 
much faster than real income (represented in principle by GDP growth) and, 
therefore, much faster than real wealth (instruments, machinery, equipment, 
premises, buildings, civil works, technology and everything else that enables 
the production of an increased fl ow of goods and services in the future). Table 
1, prepared from data produced by the McKinsey Global Institute and by 
the IMF, shows how the relationship between real and fi ctitious wealth has 
evolved since 1980.
Table 1 – Fictitious Wealth and Real Income
Year
World inventory of financial 
assets (US$ x trillion)a
Word GDP
(US$ x trillion)
Ratio financial 
assets/GDP
1980 12 11.8 1.02
1993 53 24.9 2.13
1996 69 30.3 2.28
1999 96 31.1 3.09
2003 118 37.1 3.18
2006 167 48.8 3.42
2007 195b 54.8 3.56
2010c 209 55.9 3.74
Sources: McKinsey Global Institute (Assets) and IMF (GDP); author’s development.
  * Includes stocks and debentures, public and private debt bonds, and bank investments.   
    does not include derivatives.
 ** Estimate.
*** Projections.
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Let us examine the period from 1980 to 2007. As the table shows, 
world GDP grew 464% (4.6 times) in those 27 years, while world fi nancial 
wealth grew 1,525% (16,2 times) in the same period – and this doesn’t 
include the value of derivative assets. The non-inclusion of derivatives makes 
it more diffi cult to visualize the true impact of fi nancial wealth, but including 
them is no easy task. There is no consensus as to how much they are actually 
worth. It certainly makes no sense to ascertain them by the notional value of 
the contracts, particularly in the case of futures and options, because these 
are usually liquidated for a much lower price. But how, then, should they be 
rated? No one knows for sure. Existing estimates of world fi nancial wealth 
indicate that in 2000, when non-derivative fi nancial assets were deemed to 
total US$ 200 trillion by the McKinsey Institute, derivatives amounted to 
US$ 674 trillion (US$ 595 trillion in over-the-counter contracts and US$ 79 
in contracts registered in the Bank of International Settlements). Regardless, 
what must be stressed are the enormous differences in how fast each aggregate 
has grown, made even clearer on Graph 1. What can explain this?
Sources: McKinsey Global Institute (Assets) and IMF (GDP); author’s 
development.
Obs.   To build the graph, the values of the world inventory of fi nancial assets of the 
years for which there are data available were taken to grow at a constant rate.
Graph 1 – Fictitious wealth (world inventory of fi nancial assets)
    and real world income (GDP) (US$ x trillion)
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The history of the shift from a regime of accumulation toward a regime 
of prevailing fi nancial valuation begins in the mid-1960s. After 20 years 
of vigorous growth all over the world (a result of Keynesian-style policies: 
control of effective demand, Welfare State, reconstruction of Europe and Asia, 
industrialization of Latin America), cyclical reversion takes place and growth 
slows down. The process is more intense in Europe, as it coincides with the 
end of postwar reconstruction. It is when American multinationals in Europe, 
seeing that the perspectives for gain were not as good as before, decide not to 
reinvest all their profi ts in production. However, they also choose not to remit 
their non-invested surpluses back to the United States, because tax laws at the 
time were considered too strict. So these resources (Eurodollars) began to pile 
up in The City, in London – which for all purposes had become an offshore 
district (a.k.a. Euromarket) in the early 1950s.
Although international fl ows of capital were highly regulated at the 
time, the growing American trade defi cits also contributed to fatten those 
resources, thanks to the convertibility of the current account of the balance of 
payments that takes place, still under the infl uence of Bretton Woods, in the 
mid-1950s.9 With the oil and other shocks of late 1973 (amidst infl ationary 
pressures, low American interest rates and the offshore circuit’s increasing 
ability to create credit),10 the world enters into full-blown recession. As profi t 
expectations worsen, capital starts to fl ow in even greater amounts to the 
London circuit already fattened by petrodollars. 
It is this huge mass of wealth seeking ever-greater fi nancial returns 
outside the realm of production that lies at the root of all the clamor for 
deregulation and fi nancial opening of the markets, which will be implemented 
by Thatcher and Reagan. In the 1970s, Latin American countries, desirous 
of carrying on their growth plans but curtailed by the oil shock, provided 
the demand for credit that these capitals were seeking. The abrupt changes 
in American monetary policy in 1979, including a steep increase in interest 
rates (aimed at recovering the then-threatened world hegemony of the U.S. 
currency),11 led to the fi rst crisis of fi nancialized capitalism, the debacle of 
Mexico in 1982. In addition, several banks fi led for bankruptcy in the United 
States in the early 1980s.12 In this more unregulated environment, the 
increasing frailty of Latin American debtor countries leads investors to channel 
part of this wealth to the American stock markets. The process culminated 
with the Wall Street crash of 198713 and was followed by the real estate crisis 
of 1990. Although those crises destroyed part of the very same fi nancial wealth 
that caused them, the world inventory of fi nancial assets did not stop growing 
(as shown by the data presented above).
By then, as hedge funds and institutional investors in general became 
increasingly powerful, crises could often be “produced” intentionally. The 
assault on the British pound in 1992, carried out by the hedge fund of the 
famous investor George Soros, is a case in point.14 Although localized, the 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 23 (66), 200932
collapse of the pound was a portent of the serial crises that would victimize 
Asian currencies later in the decade, this time with worldwide impact. After 
the bust of the U.S. stock and real estate markets, and even more so after the 
collapse of the Mexican currency in 1994, a substantial part of these capitals 
fl owed toward the emerging economies of Southeast Asia (known as “Asian 
tigers”). The increased infl ow of money led to an enormous expansion of 
credit, which increased the volume of investments, which attracted more 
capital and so on. When Japan fi nally managed to devaluate its currency in 
1995, after the so-called “Inverted Plaza Accord”,15 the event combines with 
mushrooming imports from Thailand, induced by the country’s vigorous 
growth, and leads to a quick deterioration of its foreign accounts.
As confi dence on the Thai currency decreases, the fi nancial asset 
bubbles that had been vigorously expanding in the region since 1994 begin to 
burst. The devaluation of the baht in early June 1997 triggers a chain reaction 
of crises that, one by one, depreciates the currency of every Asian nation, even 
South Korea’s, considered the region’s most powerful economy. The process 
is furthered by the devaluation of the yen, worsening the foreign accounts 
of all the “tigers”. In this process, the interference of institutional investors, 
and particularly of the hedge funds, accelerated the upward and downward 
oscillations. Unlike the world of intermediated fi nance (comprising, essentially, 
bank loans) in which the Latin American debt crises had taken place little 
more than a decade earlier, the world of direct fi nance that prevailed at the 
time (marked by institutional investors, the existence of secondary markets 
and forceful asset derivatives) made the bubble creation and bubble bursting 
process even more acute, spreading the impact of crises throughout the world. 
As an aftermath of the Asian crisis, Russia (1998), Brazil (1999) and, fi nally, 
Argentina (2001) faced extreme turbulences and were obliged to steeply 
devalue their currencies.
The Asian crisis, because of its impact on practically every fi nancial 
market of the world, seemed at fi rst liable to cause an extended downturn in 
the world economy. However, the unfathomable perspectives brought about 
by the dissemination of the internet, which was being consolidated at the 
time, and the exceptional growth in consumption propped by debt spending 
and the wealth-effect turned the American economy into a safe haven for 
investors frightened by the goings-on in Asia.16 This was the onset of yet 
another phenomenal asset bubble, this time in the stock markets,17 that would 
culminate in the crises of the American stock exchanges of 2000/2001. The 
American government prevented the bursting of the bubble from having much 
more serious consequences on economic growth by, once again, increasing 
liquidity. The Federal Reserve, under the helm of Alan Greenspan, thrashed 
interest rates from 6% to 1.75% in just 12 months (over the course of 2001).
The American economy responded well and the strategy proved 
successful: after growing only 0.8% in 2001, it grew 1.6% in 2002, 2.4% in 
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2003 and 3.6% in 2004. The price to be paid, however, was the creation of 
yet another bubble in yet another type of asset – the real estate market. This 
time, however, the impact of the bubble went much deeper, given the increased 
importance of hedge funds and fi nancial derivatives and the invention of a new 
instrument that would be known as “securitization”. Securitization, i.e., the 
issuance of mortgage-based bonds, not only injected tremendous liquidity in 
this market but also prevented the growing risks of such operations to become 
visible, because the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) included “privileged 
quotas” that gave bearers preferential treatment in cashing them, should any 
problem arise. For this, they received excellent ratings from the agencies, 
and even pension funds, which only invest on AAA bonds, were willing to 
carry these assets. In early 2005, the American government, concerned with 
infl ation and seeking to contain some of the speculative fever, decided to 
raise interest rates.18 Unperturbed, the wealth-effect on consumption, the 
euphoria of the stock exchanges and the infl ated value of the assets themselves 
maintained the pace of American growth. The crisis only reached full maturity 
in 2007, when the fi rst signs of default became irreversible and laid bare the 
frailness of the system and, in particular, of the so-called shadow banking 
system that created credit and currency without any kind of regulation.
As can be seen, the most striking trait of a fi nance-led regime of 
accumulation are the crises generated by recurring asset bubbles that make it 
structurally fragile. Over the last 30 years, the power of fi nancial wealth has 
molded institutions in order to create a regulatory system compatible with 
the process of capitalist reproduction under its command. Ironically, as this 
materializes, the system reaches the height of fragility. This helps to explain 
why the current crisis is of different kind: it has to be fought in much more 
adverse circumstances than previous ones (i.e., a completely deregulated 
operating environment, high level of contagion and truly global amplitude). 
Making the scenario even less auspicious is the fact that the recurrent 
expedient of increasing liquidity to save the so-called real side of the economy 
seems to be reaching its limit.19 Indicative that a certain threshold has been 
reached is the diffi culty to reverse the negative signs brought on by the crises, 
in spite of the enormous amounts of dollars poured into the main economies 
of the planet. Any resemblance to the liquidity trap is not mere coincidence, 
but there is something else that makes the current situation even more 
complicated than the one that inspired the Keynesian fi nd: an eventual success 
in overcoming the crisis will only magnify and hurl into the future the same 
vulnerabilities that were the source of the current crisis. 
The Situation and Outlook of Brazil in the Crises of the 
Regime of Financial Accumulation
Brazil has been a player in the history of fi nancialized capitalism since 
the very beginning. For instance, the country was responsible for a major part 
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of the demand for credit that led to this system’s fi rst global asset bubble, 
consubstantiated in the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s. In 
the latter half of the 1990s, Brazil became an emerging fi nancial power, 
having performed all the requisite structural overhauling – from monetary 
stabilization to unconditional fi nancial opening, from reforms in welfare to 
changes in bankruptcy legislation. Thus, the country positioned itself as an 
international platform for fi nancial valuation,20 that is, as an emerging economy 
where it was possible to obtain extremely high gains in strong currency 
(oftentimes the highest in the world). When exchange rates were determined 
by government decree (fi xed exchange rate regime), huge gains were possible 
because of sky-high interest rates, and after the crisis of 1999 (and particularly 
after 2003), with the fl oating exchange rate regime,  also because of the 
recurring and self-referenced appreciation of the Brazilian currency – leveraged, 
as it could not be otherwise, by reckless gambling on derivatives.
This manner of engaging the Brazilian economy in the world economy 
strengthened the domestic rentiers and imposed the fi nancial logic upon the 
national accumulation process. Bruno et al (2009) offer several illustrative 
indicators of this trend. The rate of accumulation of productive fi xed capital, 
for instance, fell approximately 40% in the early 1980s and stayed in this 
paltry tier for nearly a quarter of a century, whereas profi t rates recovered after 
1994 and grew fi rmly thereafter. On the other hand, the ratio between the 
inventory of fi nancial assets21 and the inventory of productive assets22 grew 
vigorously – from 15% in 1992 to approximately 75% in 2008. Over the last 
30 years, fi nancial power was exerted through various different means, but 
whatever the situation, it always increased. In years of high infl ation, two- 
currency model (one used as unit of account and means of exchange, the other 
as reserve of value) was the foundation of rent-seeking accumulation and the 
fi nancialization of wealth. After monetary stability was achieved, infl ation was 
replaced by extremely high interest rates, by even greater differences in the 
interest rates paid and charged by the fi nancial and banking sectors, and by the 
imperturbable growth of public debt as percentage of GDP (Bruno et al, 2009, 
p. 16-21).23
Not by chance, the fi rst impacts of the crisis on the Brazilian economy 
were felt by the fi nancial sector. At the onset, a crisis of confi dence completely 
stanched credit and practically froze interbank loans. A succession of bubbles 
then burst – stock bubbles, bubbles of exchange rate derivatives, bubbles of the 
exchange rates themselves that somehow induced the others.24 As it happened, 
in a wholly self-referenced movement, the appreciation of the Brazilian 
currency itself became an integral element of the strong currency valuation 
game of high fi nance that became possible in the country after 2003. And a 
vicious circle was established, whereby high interest rates brought in foreign 
currency, upped the ante on further appreciation of the Brazilian currency, 
generated even better dollar results for foreign investors, which brought 
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even more dollars into the country, and so forth. In this context, exporting 
companies, that managed to outweigh their losses with the appreciation of the 
Brazilian currency  with fi nancial gains from derivatives, suffered the direct 
impact of the crisis when the game changed. 
Impacts on the real economy have been felt little by little and result 
mainly from a deterioration of expectations. They may reverse the indicators of 
the gross formation of fi xed capital (i.e., investment) that, with great diffi culty, 
were recovering after two decades of stagnation. Government investments – 
such as the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) and the housing development 
package – may replace private investment in part, but will hardly be enough 
to compensate fully the latter’s reduction. With regard to consumption, credit 
was not affected, in spite of a certain retraction in the beginning, particularly 
for high-value goods such as automobiles. It is impossible to overstress the 
importance that credit, and specially paycheck-secured credit [known as 
“consigned credit” in Brazil], has today in sustaining the level of consumption 
– but this only confi rms the preeminence of the fi nancial dimension, that 
is, of productive accumulation that takes place only under the auspices 
and command of fi nancial accumulation. The maintenance of the level of 
consumption has led Brazil to be seen today as a haven for multinationals:25 
given the size of the Brazilian domestic market and a certain enrichment of the 
lower classes (today 20 million more people have enough income to consume 
more than essential goods), the country’s economy is being seen as a profi t 
alternative in a retracting world. The great problem is that, unlike investment, 
consumption is not dynamic enough to fully invigorate the economy – not 
to mention that credit-driven consumption is not sustainable in the long run, 
as the American mirror clearly shows. This macroeconomic arrangement, by 
which investment is once again in danger of stalling and in which credit-driven 
consumption appears as the dynamic element, is clearly inverted. Nevertheless, 
it is an arrangement typical of an accumulation process with fi nance at the 
helm, promoting the expansion of fi ctitious wealth.
References to capital from non-residents entering the Brazilian economy 
forces us to analyze what the reappearance of foreign capital in the last few 
months means in the context of the crisis. First of all, it must be remembered 
that, in spite of the latest cuts, Brazilian interest rates are still among the 
highest in the world. To be sure, with the restoration of minimum levels of 
confi dence, this evidently helps to attract foreign currency into the country, 
especially since interest rates in many parts of the world are now negative. This 
brings to mind the myth of a supposed “Bretton Woods 2” that began going 
the rounds in international fi nancial circles in 2005. According to that fable, 
disseminated among other by Ben Bernanke (current chairman of the Fed), 
the growing American current account defi cit was the natural consequence 
of “excessive global savings”. In a nutshell, the chimerical thesis stated that 
emerging economies would have to absorb dollars (through exports) until 
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their systems were mature enough to be grounded on the internal market. 
Meanwhile, they would use the excess dollar to build the capital base for 
later. It was also said that this was all taking place through natural market 
forces, which would “coalesce to create a stable, integrated system of trade and 
investment fl ows, with the United States and the dollar at its center” (Morris 
2009, p. 139). This arrangement, according to the same myth, brought to 
memory the outcome of the famous 1944 conference, thus its name.
This putative theory held that such a state of affairs was likely to last 
a long time (an assumption shattered by the crisis), but that countries such 
as Brazil would not be fully destroyed. And here we fi nd a new role for the 
Brazilian economy in fi nance-led capitalism, namely, that of absorbing the 
lack of American savings. In this manner, fi nancial command would remain 
relatively unshaken at the center of the system and relatively fi rm here. The 
infl ow of dollars would once again turn the wheel of the appreciation of the 
real and re-infl ate the bubble that had wilted with the crisis. The sustainability 
of this “arrangement” and, even more so, its ability to recreate here, 
through a virtuous circle of capitalist growth, are as safe a bet as the reverse 
macroeconomic disposition that emerged from post-crisis Brazil. 
Notas
1  This essay is part of a broader research project funded by a CNPq productivity in research 
grant, and was developed as part of the activities of CAFIN, “Institutions of Financial 
Capitalism Research Group”, registered in the same institution.
2  The brief theoretical reconstruction sketched here is based on Boyer (1990) and Bruno 
(2004).
3  Chesnais is referring to the period between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s.
4  The original French edition is from 1996.
5  The original French edition is from 2004.
6  This point is further developed in Almeida and Paulani (2009).
7  Much as in the capital markets, the magic number would be 15%, an yield that is very 
hard to achieve by any non-fi ctitious process of capital valuation.
8  On this, see Teixeira (2007, chapter 3); specifi cally on wages (and the so-called personal 
indebtedness), see Lapavitsas (2009).
9  On this, see Eichengreen (2000, chapter 4).
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10 On this, see Serrano (2004).
11 On this, see Gowan (2003, chapters 3 and 4).
12 On this, see Chesnais (2008).
13 Morris (2009) exposes another essential element in the crash of 1987: the ubiquity of new 
fi nancial technologies, particularly the ludicrous idea of providing hedge (i.e., portfolio 
insurance) for large investors, something that can conceivably work on an individual basis, 
but becomes a disaster if made available to all.
14 See Krugman (2009) for more details.
15 On this, see Brenner (2003, p. 195-82).
16 On this, see Chesnais (2003) and Brenner (2003, p. 272-7).
17 In early 1994, the Dow Jones was at 3,600. In early 2000, it had reached 11,675 points, a 
225% increase, whereas profi ts of companies listed in the NYSE grew no more than 60%.
18 The prime rate was 2.25% in January 2005, jumped to 4.25% one year later and reached 
5.25% in January 2007.
19 Morris (2009, p. 133) is of the same opinion: “The sad fact is that there isn’t much the 
Fed can do. All the years of working the liquidity pump has sucked out everything but the 
brine.”
20 This thesis is further developed in Paulani (2007, 2008a).
21 The variable in question is total of non-monetary fi nancial assets, calculated by the dif-
ference between the monetary aggregates M4 and M1, properly defl ated by the IGP-DI 
index.
22 This variable is estimated by the value of the total inventory of productive fi xed capital net 
of depreciation, that is, machinery, equipment and non-residential buildings.
23 Data in Bruno et al (2009) indicate that an investor who purchased a treasury bill indexed 
by the Selic [Brazilian prime rate] in January 1991 would have multiplied his invest-
ment by seven in January 2009, which translates into an annual appreciation rate 28.4% 
throughout the entire period. This outcome is virtually unattainable by any project from 
the real economy, anywhere in the world, at least by legal means.
24 On this, see Paulani (2008b).
25 Title of an article published in IstoÉ Dinheiro on May 22, 2009.
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ABSTRACT – There seems to be no doubt about the fact that capitalism has undergone 
drastic transformations over the last thirty years. Among critics, theses on the fi nancial 
nature of the process of accumulation have been prominent. One of these is the theory by 
French economist François Chesnais (1998, 2005) whose main proposition is that, as of the 
late 1970s, capitalism would be reproducing itself by means of an accumulation regime in 
which fi nancial valuation prevails. In this article, we attempt to show that the current crisis 
is a crisis of this regime of accumulation, and to refl ect upon the situation and prospects for 
Brazil in this context. In order to do so, we will fi rst present a brief theoretical review of 
concepts involved (fi rst section), then present the main features of the fi nancialized regime 
(second section), recall the history of the way this regime has operated in the last three 
decades (third section), and, fi nally, refl ect upon Brazil’s present situation and prospects in 
this context (fourth section).
KEYWORDS: Regime of accumulation, Mode of regulation, Financialization, Crisis, 
Brazilian economy.
Leda Maria Paulani is tenured professor of the Economics Department of FEA/
USP and of Postgraduate Studies in Economics of IPE/USP. She is the author of, 
among others, Modernidade e discurso econômico (Boitempo, 2005) and Brasil delivery 
(Boitempo, 2008). @ - paulani@uol.com.br. 
Received on 6.22.2009 and accepted on 6.24.2009.
Translated by Carlos Malferrari. The original in Portuguese is available at http://www.
scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_issuetoc&pid=0103-401420090002&lng=pt&nrm=iso. 
